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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain
appeals from district courts involving domestic relations
matters, including alimony and attorney's fees issues.

Section

78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The first three issues all deal with alimony related
questions.

The standard of review is abuse of discretion in

reviewing alimony questions.

See for example Haslam v. Haslam,

657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982).
The fourth issue addresses the propriety of an
attorney's fee award in a petition to modify a decree of divorce.
The standard of review is also abuse of discretion.

See for

example Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990).
The fifth issue asks the court to determine if a
contract was created.

That is a question of law.

The standard

of review is correction of error, no particular deference being
given to the trial court's ruling.

See for example, Herm Hughes

& Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, Inc., 834 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1992).

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES.
Section 30-3-3.(1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended,
states as follows:
(1) In any action filed under Title 30,
Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to
establish an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney
fees, and witness fees, including expert
witness fees, of the other party to enable
the other party to prosecute or defend the
action. The order may include provision for
costs of the action.
Section 30-3-5.(3), Utah Code Annotated, as amended,
states as follows:
(3) The court has continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of
the parties, the custody of the children and
their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the
property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
Section 78-2a-3.(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, states as follows:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:

(h) appeals from district court
involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody,
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married on May 7, 1966.

The parties

were divorced by Judge Richard H. Moffat on December 20, 1990,
after a trial on October 18, 1990.

They had three children, two

of which were under age 18 at the time of the divorce.
Plaintiff was awarded custody of the children.
attending college at the time of the divorce.

The

The Plaintiff was
The Defendant was

ordered to pay child support, to pay alimony, and to keep the
Plaintiff on his health care policy while she continued her
college education.

Alimony was to continue for four years or

while the Plaintiff continued her education.

When the Plaintiff

would be no longer enrolled full time in college, the Court
ordered an automatic review of the alimony issue upon the request
of the Defendant so that the Court could reduce or terminate
alimony.

The automatic alimony review provision was not

appealed.
On August 31, 1994, the Plaintiff graduated from the
University of Utah with a four year degree.

In October, 1994, at

the Plaintiff's request, the Defendant agreed to forgo filing a
request for a review of the alimony issue and to continue paying
alimony and providing health care coverage, while the Plaintiff
continued to seek employment.

The Defendant reports that in

return the Plaintiff agreed to seek no additional alimony or
insurance once she found employment.
3

The Defendant did as agreed, including keeping the
Plaintiff insured and paying alimony for October, November,
December, January, February, March and April, 1995.

The

Plaintiff accepted and never objected to the continued health
care coverage and alimony payments.
employment on February 20, 1995.

The Plaintiff found

She then refused to honor their

earlier bargain and insisted on the Defendant paying alimony of
$170.00 per month for a five year period.
The Defendant filed a Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce on April 24, 1995, raising the alimony and several other
issues.

The Plaintiff filed an Answer to Petition and

Counterclaim on June 23, 1995, seeking an increase in alimony and
raising several other issues.

All issues, except alimony, were

resolved prior to the hearing on June 12, 1996, which hearing's
rulings are the subject of this appeal.
Judge Sandra Peuler heard the alimony petitions of the
parties and found that the Plaintiff's net earned income had gone
from $110.00 per month to $1,283.00 per month, excluding alimony.
Judge Peuler concluded that when net earned income and child
support are added together, and before any alimony is paid, the
Plaintiff falls approximately $250.00 short of covering her
updated, sworn expenses.

The court determined the Defendant had

the ability to pay alimony.

4

The Court then found no substantial change in
circumstances and refused to reduce or terminate alimony, which
left the Plaintiff with $300.00 more in alimony than her sworn
expenses.
The court ignored the Plaintiff's monthly income, along
with her $70,600.00 house equity and $9,184.00 in savings and
ordered the Defendant to pay $1,500.00 of the Plaintiff's
disputed attorney's fees.
The court determined no meeting of the minds had
occurred during the parties' discussions regarding the
termination of alimony and health care and found no agreement.
The Court entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Judgment and Decree on August 5, 1996.

Notice of Appeal

was filed on August 22, 1996.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties' divorce trial was on October 18, 1990,

and their divorce was final on December 21, 1990.
page 10.)

(Transcript,

The decision was not appealed.
2.

The Defendant was ordered to pay alimony of $350.00

per month for a period of time and thereafter to pay alimony of
$550.00 per month, which was paid through April, 1995.
(Transcript, page 11.)
3.

The Plaintiff was allowed by the original trial
5

court to spend four years completing her college education and at
the conclusion of that period of time the Defendant could
petition the court to reduce or to terminate alimony.
(Transcript, page 12.)
4.

The Defendant was required to maintain health and

accident insurance on the Plaintiff, while she was a full time
student.

(Transcript, page 13.)
5.

The Plaintiff graduated from the University of Utah

in August, 1994, with a major in communications.

(Transcript,

page 14.)
6.

In October, 1994, the Defendant wrote "last check"

in the lower left-hand corner of his monthly alimony check.
(Transcript, page 14.)
7.

As a result of the Defendant's writing "last check"

on the October alimony check, the parties discussed continuation
of alimony and health insurance.

(Transcript, pages 14, 15, 16,

17, 18, and 19.)
8.

The Plaintiff claims that the parties agreed that

the Plaintiff would try harder to find employment and that the
Defendant would continue to pay alimony.
9.

(Transcript, page 17.)

The Defendant claims that the parties agreed that

the Defendant would not take the matter back to court at that
time, that he would continue health insurance coverage, and that
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he would continue paying alimony until the Plaintiff found a job.
(Transcript, pages 65, 66 and 67.)
10.

In April, 1995, the Plaintiff sent a letter

requesting that alimony be set at $170.00 per month for five
years, which the Plaintiff claims shows the Plaintiff's state of
mind after the Defendant demanded the agreement be honored.
(Transcript, pages 19, 94 and 95.)
11.

In the December 20, 1990, Findings of Fact, the

court found that the Plaintiff was earning $110.00 per month and
the Defendant was earning $3,100.00 per month. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, December 20, 1990, paragraphs 8 and 9.)
12.

Judge Peular found that the Plaintiff's net full

time employment income was $1,083.00 and her part time employment
income was $200.00, for a total earned income of $1,283.00, and
when child support was added in, she had income of $1,577.00 per
month.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, August 5, 1996,

paragraphs 4, 5, and 6.)
13.

Judge Peular found that the Defendant's gross

income was $3,800.00 and his net income was $2,600.00 per month.
(Transcript, page 134.)
14.

The Plaintiff had accumulated a total of $9,184.00

in savings at the time of the Petition hearing.
Declaration of Arbra Johnson, paragraph 5.(d).)
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(Financial

15.

The Plaintiff's house was valued by her at

$85,000.00, less the outstanding mortgage balance of about
$5,900.00 and another lien (to the Defendant) of $8,500.00, for a
net equity of $70,600.00 at the time of the Petition hearing.
(Financial Declaration of Arbra Johnson, paragraph 5.(h).)
16.

The Defendant had accumulated $425.00 in .savings

and nothing in real property at the time of the Petition hearing.
(Financial Declaration of Merrill Johnson, paragraph 5.(d) and
(h) .)
17.

The Plaintiff's monthly expenses were found to be

$1,824.00, which left the Plaintiff $250.00 per month short of
meeting her monthly expenses.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, August 5, L996, paragraph 7.

See also Financial

Declaration of Arbra Johnson, paragraph 6.)
18.

The Plaintiff's attorney charged the Plaintiff

$80.00 per hour for his work, including 13 hours of work on a
memorandum, the necessity of which memorandum the Defendant
challenged.

(Transcript, pages 101 and 102).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the original Decree of Divorce the court ordered
alimony to be reduced or terminated when the Plaintiff obtained
her college degree.

That order was not appealed.

The specific

intentions of the original court were ignored and the court
8

hearing the petition being appealed from failed to reduce or
terminate alimony, as was intended and ordered by Judge Moffat,
which is an abuse of discretion.
The court hearing the petition failed to find a change
of circumstances, even though the Plaintiff's net earned income
increased from $110.00 per month to $1,283.00 per month,, which is
an abuse of discretion.
The court did not look at the Plaintiff's complete
financial condition.

The court awarded the Plaintiff $300.00 per

month in alimony more than her sworn expenses indicated.
court looked only at the Plaintiff's claimed "needs".

The

The court

ignored the Plaintiff's overall "financial condition", including
the almost $80,000.00 in assets of the Plaintiff.

All of which

is an abuse of discretion.
The court ordered that the Defendant pay $1,500.00 of
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees without considering the almost
$80,000.00 in assets of the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's financial

condition is such that an award based upon need was an abuse of
discretion.
The court found no contract establishing an accord and
satisfaction.

The Plaintiff accepted the benefits of the

parties' agreement and then claimed no agreement existed.
Plaintiff's acceptance of the benefits and actions in
9

The

April, 1995, establish a contract existed.

The court's

conclusion of law was incorrect and should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO REDUCE OR TERMINATE
ALIMONY AS ORDERED IN THE PARTIES' ORIGINAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE?
At the time of the parties' original divorce trial,
October 18, 1990, the Plaintiff was attending college and the
Defendant was working.

It was anticipated that the Plaintiff

would continue to attend college for four years, while the
Defendant continued to work.

The court did not intend alimony to

be set at a certain level and to remain at that level longer than
the period of the Plaintiff's college education.

In paragraph 13

of the Findings of Fact, the court stated its "intent"
specifically as follows:
13. ... It is the intent of the Court
that when Plaintiff has obtained a college
degree (other than an associate degree), that
Defendant should have the right at that time
to petititon the Court to review the issue of
alimony for the purpose of determining
whether alimony should be terminated or
substantially reduced. To that end, alimony
shall continue for four (4) years. At the
end of the four-year period Defendant shall
have the right to petition the Court for the
purpose of determining whether alimony should
be reduceid or terminated. If at any time
during the four-year period, Plaintiff does
10

not maintain enrollment as a full-time
student, Defendant shall have the right to
petition this Court in regards to reducing or
terminating alimony.
The "intent" of the court was made its ruling.

An

order was issued in the accompanying Decree of Divorce, wherein
it is stated:
7. ... Alimony shall continue for four
(4) years. At the end of the four-period
Defendant shall have the right to petition
the Court for the purpose of determining
whether alimony should be reduced or
terminated. If at any time during the fourperiod, Plaintiff does not maintain
enrollment as a full-time student, Defendant
shall have the right to petition the Court in
regards to reducing or terminating alimony.
For four years the Plaintiff enjoyed the benefit of
Judge Moffat's ruling and the gaining of a college degree.

For

four years the Defendant paid the alimony faithfully, expecting
Judge Moffat's ruling to be honored when the Plaintiff graduated.
Neither party appealed the Judge's setting of alimony for a four
year period, with the requirement that alimony would be reduced
or terminated when the Plaintiff graduated from college.
Plaintiff appears to now object to this ruling.

The

However, she has

waited until after the Defendant had sought to have the court
enforce this order to reduce or terminate alimony before she
objected to Judge Moffat's ruling.
On April 24, 1995, the Defendant filed a Petition to
Modify the Decree of Divorce seeking to enforce Judge Moffat's
11

Order.

In response, the Plaintiff filed an Answer to Petition

and Counterclaim, wherein she sought for an increase in alimony.
A similar situation occurred in Campos v. Campos, 523
P.2d 1235 (Utah 1974), wherein the court ruled at trial that the
father should pay child support on two children of the marriage.
No appeal was taken.

Shortly thereafter, the father filed a

petition to modify the decree and to gain custody of the children
for himself, thus relying upon the terms of the decree.
court denied this petition.

The

The father then filed a petition to

modify the decree, wherein he claimed that one of the children
was the son of another man and that he should not have to pay
child support on this child that was supposedly not his.

The

court denied the petition, noting that the father did not raise
this issue at the time of the trial or in the interim.

The court

concluded that this was merely an attempt to appeal beyond the
time for appeal stating as follows:
It appears to us that the defendant is
attempting in these proceedings for a
modification to have this court review the
decree of divorce originally entered after
the time for appeal from that decree has long
since expired.
Campos, at 1236.
The trial court has the continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for maintenance pursuant to
Section 30-3-5, of the Divorce Chapter.

12

However, the court must

find that the circumstances contemplated by Judge Moffat had
changed in order to ignore the original Decree.

Judge Moffat

intended for the Plaintiff to obtain a college degree and to get
a job.

The circumstances contemplated by Judge Moffat happened.

Judge Peular's court, in essence acting as a belated appellate
court, failed to follow Judge Moffat's Order.
Judge Moffat intended to allow the Plaintiff to attend
school full time for a four year period.

He could have required

her to go to work immediately and to contribute to her support.
He appeared to believe that a college educated person could more
easily support herself.

The Defendant was required to support

the Plaintiff while she went to college.

The Defendant did so in

reliance upon Judge Moffat's order.
It is patently unfair for the Plaintiff to take the
benefit of Judge Moffat's ruling and then to ask for alimony to
remain the same or to increase.

It is also an abuse of

discretion for Judge Peular to not enforce Judge Moffat's nonappealed prior ruling.

Alimony should be reduced or terminated

as of the date the Petition to Modify was filed.

POINT II
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT FINDING A CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES, WHERE PLAINTIFF'S NET EARNED INCOME HAD
INCREASED FROM $110.00 PER MONTH TO $1,283.00 PER MONTH?
At the time of the parties' divorce, the Plaintiff was
13

found to be earning $110.00 per month.

At the Petition to Modify

hearing the Plaintiff's net take home pay from her full time
employment was found to be $1,083.00 and from her part time
employment was found to be $2 00.00, i.e., total income of
$1,283.00.

If child support is added in, then she was found to

have $1,577.00 per month to spend.
At the time of the parties' divorce, the Defendant was
found to have gross earnings of $3,100.00 per month.

At the

Petition to Modify hearing his net income was found to be
$2,600.00 per month.

No net income was determined at the divorce

trial for the Defendant.
In summary, the Plaintiff's net income increased as
follows between the divorce trial and the petition hearing:
Date

Monthly Net Earnings

October, 1990

$110.00

June, 1996

$1,283.00

1,066% change (a $1,173.00 per month increase)
In addition, the Plaintiff had accumulated a
substantial amount of savings, i.e., $9,184.00, along with net
equity in her house of about $70,600.00.

On the other hand, the

Defendant had accumulated no savings and had no equity in any
real property.
In the case of Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah
1982), the Supreme Court found an abuse of discretion by a trial
14

court failing to find a substantial change in circumstances in a
situation very much like the situation now before the court.
In Haslamf the wife was unemployed at the time of the
divorce.

Seventeen years later, she had obtained employment and

was earning $1,200.00 per month.

She had also accumulated

$12,000.00 in savings from which she drew interest.
In Haslam, the husband earned between $1,000.00 and
$1,200.00 per month at the time of the divorce.
later he had retired and remarried.

Seventeen years

He received $1,250.00 per

month from social security, a pension, and stock dividends.
The court found as follows:
On the instant facts it is clear that
there has been a substantial change in
circumstances. Since the divorce, the former
Mrs. Haslam has obtained employment,
experienced a substantial increase in income
and has accumulated some savings. Mr. Haslam
has retired and presently receives income in
approximately the same amount as he received
at the time of the divorce some seventeen
years ago.
Under the circumstances of this case, we
think that the combination of the supporting
spouse's retirement, together with the
dependent spouse's employment, earning of a
substantial income, and accumulation of
substantial savings subsequent to the
original divorce decree, constitutes a
substantial change of circumstances.
Haslam, at 758.
The Haslam case is almost identical with the present
case.

The Plaintiff's earnings in Haslam went from zero to
15

$1,200.00 per month, while Ms. Johnson's earnings went from
$110.00 to $1,283.00 per month.

In Haslam the Plaintiff

accumulated $12,000.00 in savings, while Ms. Johnson accumulated
$9,184.0 0 in savings and $70,600.00 equity built up in her house.
The Defendant's earnings in Haslam went from $1,000.00
to $1,200.00 per month while Mr. Johnson's gross earnings went
from $3,100.00 to $3,800.00 per month.
was $2,600.00 per month.

Mr. Johnson's net income

In Haslam the Defendant apparently had

accumulated some stock dividends, while Mr. Johnson has
accumulated no assets.
In Haslam the Supreme Court reinstated the petition and
sent the matter back to the trial court to modify the decree as
equity required.
case.

The Defendant seeks the same relief in this

The court abused its discretion by not finding a change in

circumstances.
her alimony!

The Plaintiff's increase in her income doubled
The court should have reduced or terminated the

Defendant's alimony payments as of the date of filing this
action.

POINT III
DID THE COURT ERR BY CHOOSING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF
$550.00 PER MONTH, WHICH AMOUNT EXCEEDED PLAINTIFF'S SWORN
EXPENSES BY 5300.00 PER MONTH, AND BY NOT LOOKING AT THE
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLETE FINANCIAL CONDITION?
In determining a reasonable alimony award the court
must consider three factors:
16

(1)

the financial condition and needs of the receiving
spouse;

(2)

the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a
sufficient income for him or herself; and

(3)

the ability of the responding spouse to provide
support.

Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah App. 1990) citations
omitted.
The same factors apply to petitions to modify decrees
of divorce.

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121

(Utah

App. 1988).
Judge Peular did make specific findings of fact on the
three factors.

The court concluded that when the Plaintiff's

income of $1,577.00 is deducted from her sworn expenses of
$1,824.00, then the Plaintiff falls about $250.00 per month short
of meeting her expenses, which should have led the court to set
alimony at a point no greater than $250.00 per month, instead of
at $550.00 per month.
As a part of the first factor, the trial court is
obligated to consider the financial condition of the receiving
spouse and not just that spouse's claimed needs.

Munns, at 121;

Throckmorton, at 124, along with the multitude of other cases
cited.
The best evidence of the Plaintiff's needs is her sworn
Financial Declaration.

It should be true.

17

At the hearing the Plaintiff claimed that the $1,824.25
of claimed monthly expenses in the Financial Declaration,
including the $186.00 per month she was spending for clothing and
$150.00 per month she was spending on food were not enough.
Either her Financial Declaration or her in court testimony was
apparently not true.
The financial condition of the Plaintiff was not
considered by Judge Puelar.

On her financial declaration form,

the Plaintiff's stated value of the house was $85,000.00 less a
mortgage of $5,923.76 and an $8,500.00 lien payable in the future
to the Defendant.

That left equity of approximately $70,600.00,

which belonged to the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's stated savings

in the financial declaration form was $9,184.00.

All totaled,

the Plaintiff had a net worth of just less than $80,000.00.
financial condition is not very bad.
to consider her net worth.

Her

However, the court refused

The court looked only at the

Plaintiff's "needs'" testimony, wherein the Plaintiff claimed to
lack money for food and clothes.
When the court looks at all of the evidence supporting
the court's conclusion to award $3 00.00 per month in alimony over
and above the expenses, there is insufficient evidence to support
the court's ruling.

The court abused its discretion.

It looked

only at the Plaintiff's claimed "needs", not at her "financial
condition".

If alimony is not terminated it should at very least
18

be reduced to $250.00 per month from the date the Defendant's
petition was filed.

POINT IV
DID THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER THE
PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTANTIAL ASSETS CONSTITUTE A FAILURE TO
FULLY CONSIDER FINANCIAL NEED FOR AN ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD?
By statute, Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, the court is authorized to award attorney's fees.

It is

well established that to recover attorney's fees the moving party
must show evidence establishing the financial need of the
requesting party and demonstrate the reasonableness of the amount
of the award.

Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990),

(Citations omitted.)
The Plaintiff sought an award of her attorneys in this
action.

Both the financial need of the Plaintiff and the

reasonableness of the amount of the award were challenged.

The

court found that the Plaintiff lacked the ability to pay the fees
and that a portion of the fees were reasonable.

The court then

reduced the fee from $2,480.00 to $1,500.00 and directed the
Defendant to pay that fee of the Plaintiff.
On the issue of reasonableness, the Defendant claimed
that 13 hours of the time the Plaintiff spent on a memorandum
were unnecessary.

At the Plaintiff's attorney's hourly fee of

$80.00, that would mean $1,040.00 of the $2,480.00 fee was
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challenged.

If the $1,040.00 is deducted from the $2,480.00, a

balance of $1,440.00 is left.

Without the court specifying its

reason for a reduction to $1,500.00, it appears that the court
accepted the Defendant's claim that $1,040.00 of the Plaintiff's
attorney's fees were unnecessary.

Consequently, the

reasonableness of the amount awarded is not being challenged.
The Defendant does challenge the court's finding that
the Plaintiff lacked the ability to pay those fees.

The trial

court failed to consider the Plaintiff's stated net worth of just
less than $80,000.00, as was discussed above under Point III.
The Plaintiff had $9,184.00 in savings.
in equity in her house.

She had about $70,600.00

She could tap either of these assets to

pay her attorney's fees.
It is well established that it is an abuse of
discretion for a court to not base an award of attorneys fee on
need.

Kerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980).

The trial

court's award of attorney's fees should be reversed and each
party should pay their own attorney's fees.

POINT V
DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT FINDING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES TO TERMINATE ALIMONY AND HEALTH CARE WHEN THE
DEFENDANT FULLY EXECUTED HIS PART OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE
PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED WITHOUT OBJECTION THE BENEFITS
TENDERED TO HER?
Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the Defendant had a
20

right to seek a review of the alimony award at the end of the
Plaintiff's full-time student enrollment (Decree, paragraph 7 ) ,
and to discontinue health and accident insurance coverage at the
end of the Plaintiff's full-time student enrollment (Decree,
paragraph 17). With these two rights in mind, the parties
discussed the issues of alimony and of continued health care
coverage for the Plaintiff after the Defendant had written "last
check" on his October, 1994, alimony check.
The elements of a contract must be present in an accord
and satisfaction, including proper subject matter, offer and
acceptance, competent parties, and consideration.

Bench v.

Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1988) .
As in the Bench case, the Plaintiff does not dispute the terms of
the agreement the Defendant detailed, i.e., he would waive his
right for an immediate review of the alimony issue and continue
health insurance for the Plaintiff, while she sought full-time
employment, and in return when she obtained full time employment
she would drop her claim for alimony.
claims she did not agree.

The Plaintiff merely

The Plaintiff claims she only agreed

to try harder to find a job.
Likewise, as in Bench, the Plaintiff accepted, without
objection all of the benefits of the parties' bargain.
claims there was no meeting of the minds.

Now she

The court in Bench

refused to allow the Plaintiff to accept the benefits without
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objection and then claim no agreement existed.

The court stated:

It is well-established that "mutual assent or
the meeting of the minds may be proved by
words spoken as well as by acts and conduct."
Thornton v. Pasch, 139 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Utah
1943) .
In addition, in Utah the doctrine of promissory
estoppel is recognized.

Suqarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson,

610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980).

Promissory estoppel requires an

individual who makes a promise, which the individual would
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the other party, to be estopped from later denying or repudiating
the earlier promise.

Sugarhouse, at 1373.

In this situation, the Defendant agreed to leave the
Plaintiff covered by his health care insurance, to not seek an
immediate review of the alimony issue, and to pay alimony until
the Plaintiff obtained full-time employment.

The Plaintiff's

real mind set is shown by her attempt in April, 1995, to get the
Defendant to change the deal and agree to pay her $170.00 per
month for five years as alimony.

If she truly had not agreed or

truly needed the $550.00 per month in alimony, then why was she
trying to negotiate a change?

The answer is that she knew she

had made a deal and now wanted out of the deal.
The Plaintiff's actions establish her meeting of the
mind with the Defendant.

The Plaintiff's actions should now

estop her from denying the agreement.
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There was an accord and

satisfaction and the Defendant's obligation to pay alimony should
have terminated when the Plaintiff obtained full-time employment
in February, 1995.
The standard of review on the issue of whether a
contract exists is a correction of error.

No particular

deference is given to the trial court's ruling on this question
of law.
An agreement was reached between the parties.
both behaved as if it would be honored.

The Plaintiff received

the benefits of the bargain without objection.
did not exist.

They

She now claims it

The court should confirm the existence of the

agreement and terminate the Defendant's alimony obligation as of
February, 1996.

CONCLUSION
The court hearing the petition to modify the decree
abused its discretion by failing to reduce or to terminate
alimony as was originally intended.

The court went further and

failed to even find a change of circumstances when Plaintiff's
net earned income rose from $110.00 per month to $1,283.00 per
month.

The court chose not to look at the complete financial

condition of the Plaintiff and ignored her almost $80,000.00 in
assets, including her $9,184.00 in savings.

Consequently, the

Plaintiff was awarded $300.00 more in alimony than her sworn
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expenses showed and $1,500.00 in attorney's fees.

This failure

to look at the complete financial condition was an abuse of
discretion.
The court also found no accord and satisfaction, even
though the Plaintiff had accepted the benefits of the parties'
agreement.

Her claim that no contract existed and the court's

conclusion of law to that effect were not correct and should be
reversed, terminating the Defendant's alimony obligation in
February, 1995.
DATED this U^

day of November, 1996

PAUL D. LYMAN
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was placed in the
United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage
thereon fully prepaid, on the

^^

day of November, 1996,

addressed as follows:
Gregory B. Wall
WALL 8c WALL
Attorney at Law
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, signed December, 1990
Decree of Divorce, signed December, 1990
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, signed August 5, 1996
Judgment and Decree, signed August 5, 1996
Notice of Entry of Judgment and Decree, signed August 8, 1996
Financial Declaration of Arbra Johnson
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R l » .STRICT COUIIT
Third Judicial District

DEC 2 0 1990
SALT LAKH COUNTY

Mark T. Ethington (4828)
DAY & BARNEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)262-6800
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARBRA F. JOHNSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff,

AND

vs .
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
MERRILL D. JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case no. 894904175 DA
Judge Richard H. Moffat

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before this Court on
Thursday, the 18th day of October, 1990, before the Honorable Richard
H. Moffat, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting without jury.
The Plaintiff appeared in person and by her attorney Mark T.
Ethington.
D. Lyman.

The Defendant appeared in person and by his attorney Paul
The parties stipulated as to the majority of the issues,

and in regards to those issues not stipulated to, the Court received
testimony and evidence on behalf of each of the parties in support of
their relative claims, and being fully advised in the premises now
makes and enters its, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

That Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah for more than three (3) months immediately
prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

That Plaintiff and Defendant are married having been legally

wed on the 7th day of May, 1966, in the State of Utah, City of Salt
Lake.
3.

That the ninety day waiting period required by Section 30-3-

18, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), has expired.
4.

That grounds for divorce exist in that there are

irreconcilable differences in the marriage such that the marriage can
not continue.
5.

That the parties have two minor children born as issue of the

marriage, namely:

Brandi Johnson, born June 8, 1973; and Marilyn

Johnson, born May 1, 1979.

The parties also have a third child,

Melanie Johnson, who has reached her majority.
6.

That the parties stipulated in open court that the Plaintiff

is a fit a proper person to have the sole care, custody, and control
of the parties' minor children following the entry of a final Decree
of Divorce in this matter.
7.

That it was further stipulated by the parties in open court

that the Defendant should be awarded reasonable rights of visitation
at such times and places as agreed upon by the parties.
8.

That, for purposes of determining child support and alimony,

the Defendant's average monthly income will be $3,100.00.

This

figure was derived after the Court received testimony by an employee

of Defendant's employer that Defendant's average monthly income would
be $3,423.00, and testimony from Defendant that he spent
approximately $347.60 per month in auto expenses for his employment
for which he was not reimbursed.

Consequently, the Court gave a

credit for the monthly auto expense leaving an approximate monthly
income of $3,100.00.
9.

That, for purposes of determining child support and alimony/

the Plaintiff's average monthly income is $110.00.
10. That the minor children of the parties are in need of
support, and, pursuant to the child support

worksheet attached

hereto, the total amount of child support to be paid by Defendant
should be $588.79 per month.
11. That the parties stipulated in open court that the child
support would be paid on the first of each month, and that the child
support would be paid through the clerks office at the Third District
Court.
12. That if the Defendant becomes delinquent in his child support
obligation for the minor children of the parties' in an amount at
least equal to child support payable for one month, then the
Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income withholding relief
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45d-l, et seq. (1953 as
amended).

This income withholding procedure shall apply to existing

and future payors.

All withheld income shall be submitted to the

Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 15450, Salt lake City, Utah

84115-0400, until such time as the Defendant no longer owes child
support for the remaining minor child of the parties.
13. That Plaintiff is in need of support in the form of alimony,
and based upon the monthly expenses of Plaintiff, and based upon the
Defendant's ability to pay, the amount of alimony should be $3 50.00
per month, and when Brandi turns 18 on June 8, 1991, th'e amount of
alimony should increase to $550.00 per month.

Alimony is to be paid

the first of each month through the clerks office at the Third
District Court.

It is the intent of the Court that when Plaintiff

has obtained a college degree (other than an associate degree), that
Defendant should have the right at that time to petition the Court to
review the issue of alimony for the purpose of determining whether
alimony should be terminated or substantially reduced.
alimony shall continue for four (4) years.

To that end,

At the end of the four-

year period Defendant shall have the right to petition the Court for
the purpose of determining whether alimony should be reduced or
terminated.

If at any time during the four-year period, Plaintiff

does not maintain enrollment as a full-time student, Defendant shall
have the right to petition this Court in regards to reducing or
terminating alimony.
14. That the parties should, by April 30th of each year
hereafter, exchange W-2 forms and tax returns.

This should be done

to facilitate any adjustments in child support and alimony.
15. That it was stipulated in open court by the parties that the
minor children are in need of health insurance, and that the

Defendant should continue to maintain the minor children on the
health insurance policy maintained through his employment.

That the

parties should equally share in the payment of deductible and
uncovered medical and dental expenses, except that major medical and
dental expenses, such as braces for Marilyn, should be paid by the
parties according to the same ratio that each party pays for child
support as indicated by the child support worksheet attached hereto.
That the parties should consult with one another, in non-emergency
situations, regarding whether to incur major medical and dental
expenses.

The Defendant's consent to non-emergency, major uncovered

medical and dental services should not be unreasonably withheld.
16. That the Defendant should maintain a life insurance policy on
himself with the minor children as beneficiaries with each child to
be listed as a 50% beneficiary so long as each child is a minor.
17. That it was stipulated in open court that the parties
maintained a marital residence at 3442 W. Brett Ave. in Salt Lake
County, and that the stipulated value of the residence is $52,000.00,
and that the Plaintiff should be awarded the house subject to an
equitable lien in favor of the Defendant in the amount of $8,500.00.
18. That the parties stipulated in open court that, assuming the
second mortgage is completely paid by the Defendant, there is
approximately $42,000.00 in equity in the home, and that the
Defendant currently has two IRA's through his employment worth
approximately $25,000.00, and that the Defendant should keep the
IRA's free and clear of any interest of Plaintiff's, and that

Plaintiff should be given a $12,500.00 credit against Defendant's
interest (which is $21,000.00), in the equity in the home, leaving
the Defendant an $8,500.00 equitable interest in the home.
19. That in order to perfect the Defendant's interest in the
home, the Defendant should convey by Quit-Claim deed his interest in
the home to the Plaintiff, and in return, the Plaintiff .should
execute in favor of the Defendant a Trust Deed and Note against the
home in the amount of $8,500.00.
20. That the parties stipulated in open court that Plaintiff
should pay the $8,500.00 to the Defendant when the Plaintiff sells
the home, or when the Plaintiff remarries, or when the youngest child
of the parties, Marilyn, reaches age 18, whichever occurs first.
21. That it was stipulated in open court that the Defendant
should continue to pay those debts of the parties that he has
heretofore paid since the separation of the parties, and in
particular, that the Defendant should continue to pay and be
responsible for the second mortgage on the home.

That it was further

stipulated that each party would be responsible for the individual
debts they have incurred since the parties separated.
22. That it was stipulated in open court that the Defendant would
be awarded the boat, the camper, and the 4X4 truck, and that the
Defendant would sell these items and use the proceeds to pay off the
second mortgage.
23. That it was stipulated in open court that the Defendant

should be awarded those items of personal property in the garage as
agreed upon by the parties.
24. That it was stipulated in open court that as long as both
parties remain unmarried, and as long as the Plaintiff remains a
full-time student, the Defendant should be required to maintain the
Plaintiff on the health and accident insurance policy offered through
his employment.
25. That it was stipulated in open court that the Plaintiff
should be awarded the Oldsmobile, and Defendant should be awarded the
Monte Carlo, each free and clear of any interest of the other.
26. That the Defendant should be allowed to claim the two minor
children as exemptions for income tax purposes.
27. That based upon representations of counsel for Plaintiff as
to the time he has spent on this case and the amount of fees he has
charged, the Plaintiff should be awarded attorneys fees in the
amount of $1,500.00.

The attorneys fees may be paid in monthly

installments as agreed upon by Defendant and counsel for Plaintiff.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters its,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving

the bonds of matrimony in this marriage upon the grounds set forth in
the Findings of Fact.

The Decree shall become final upon its entry.

2.

The specific Findings above are to be enforceable as an

order

of this Court, and are set forth in the Decree entered in this

I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney, and
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage pre-paid, to:
Paul D. Lyman, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
250 N. Main
Richfield, Utah 84701
on this

day of December, 1990.

FiiEeSJSTBlCTGOUP.I
Third Judicial District

DEC 2 0 1990
SALT \Ml4S£i

Mark T. Ethington (4828)
DAY & BARNEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84 107
Telephone: (801)262-6800
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARBRA F. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

?:06 a/on-

vs.
MERRILL D. JOHNSON,

Case No. 894904175 DA
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trail before this Court on
Thursday, the 18th day of October, 1990, before the Honorable Richard
H. Moffat, District Court Judge, presiding and sitting without jury.
The Plaintiff appeaired in person and by her attorney Mark T.
Ethington.
D. Lyman.

The Defendant appeared in person and by his attorney Paul
The parties stipulated as to the majority of the issues,

and in regards to those issues not stipulated to, the Court received
testimony and evidence on behalf of each of the parties in support of
their relative claims.

The Court, after being fully advised and

having rendered its decision herein by way of written Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and it appearing that judgment should be
entered in accordance therewith, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

The Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving the

bonds of matrimony between Plaintiff and Defendant.

The Decree

shall become final upon entry and is awarded by reason of grounds
found by the Court in accordance with Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-1
(1953 as amended), to wit:

There are irreconcilable differences in

the marriage such that the marriage cannot continue.
2.

The parties have two minor children born as issue of the

marriage, namely:

Brandi Johnson, born June 8, 1973; and Marilyn

Johnson, born May 1, 1979.

The parties also have a third child,

Melanie Johnson, who has reached her majority.
3.

The Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the

parties 7 minor children, with the Defendant to have reasonable rights
of visitation as agreed upon by the parties.
4.

The Defendant shall pay child support in the total amount of

$588.79 per month.

The amount of child support is calculated

pursuant to the child support worksheet attached hereto and by this
reference made a part hereof.
5.

The child support shall be paid by the first of each month,

and shall be paid through the clerks office at the Third District
Court.
6.

If the Defendant becomes delinquent in his child support

obligation in an amount at least equal to child support payable for
one month, then the Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income
withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45d-l, et
seq. (1953 as amended).

This income withholding procedure shall

apply to existing and future payors.

All withheld income shall be

submitted to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 15450, Salt
lake City, Utah

34 115-0400, until such time as the Defendant no

longer owes child support for the remaining minor child of the
parties.
7.

The Defendant shall pay alimony to the Plaintiff in the

amount of $350.00 per month, and when Brandi turns 18 on June 8,
1991, the amount of alimony shall increase to $550.00 per month.
Alimony is to be paid by the first of each month, and is to be paid
through the clerks office at the Third District Court.
continue for four (4) years.

Alimony shall

At the end of the four-period Defendant

shall have the right to petition the Court for the purpose of
determining whether alimony should be reduced or terminated.

If at

any time during the four-period, Plaintiff does not maintain
enrollment as a full-time student, Defendant shall have the right to
petition the Court in regards to reducing or terminating alimony.
8.

The parties shall, by April 30th of each year hereafter,

exchange W-2 forms and tax returns and paycheck stubs in order to
facilitate any adjustments in child support and alimony.
9.

The Defendant shall continue to maintain the minor children

on the health and accident insurance policy maintained through his
employment.

The parties shall equally share in the payment of

deductible and uncovered medical and dental expenses, except that
major medical and dental expenses, such as braces for Marilyn, shall
be paid by the parties according to the same ratio that each party

is responsible for child support as indicated by the child support
worksheet attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
The parties shall consul t witheac

w.

-; ergency

situations, regarding whether to incur major
dental expenses.

icovered medical or

The Defendant's consent to non-emergenc.. major,

uncovered med Ica] and den 1:a 1 servIces sha 1 ] i Iot be i inreat> i;.olv
withheld.
10. The Defendant shall maintain a life insurance policy

on

himself with I:he rntI noi: chi 1 dren as the beneficiaries with each chi 1 d
to be listed as a 50% beneficiary so long as each child is a minor.
il. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital residence of the
parties located a !:: 3442 W

Brett Ave., in Salt Lake County, subject

to an equitable lien in favor of the Defendant in the amount of
$-8#5oo.OO, Which shall be due and payable when the PI ai nt :i ff sells
the house, remarries, or when the youngest child, Marilyn, reaches
the age
P

whichever occurs first
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Plaintiff, and Plaintiff shall ,j. , -. L^ ~
and Note for the amount .
12. The Def endai •

.

f

Defendant shall give to

the equitable
:

home to

Defendant
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Deed

nterest.
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through his employment free and clear of any Interest of the

Plaintiff.
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The Defendant shii 1 1 o»nt lime lu 11 IL "| im! be responsible for

those debts of the parties that he has heretofore paid since the

separation of the parties.

In particular, the Defendant shall pay

and be responsible for the second mortgage on the marital residence.
14. The parties shall be responsible for the individual debts
they have incurred since the separation of the parties.
15. The Defendant shall be awarded the boat, the 4X4 truck, and
the camper, and the Defendant shall sell these items and use the
proceeds thereof to pay off the second mortgage.
16. The Defendant shall be awarded those items of personal
property in the garage as agreed upon by the parties.
17. As long as both parties remain unmarried, and as long as
Plaintiff remains a full-time student, Plaintiff shall remain on the
Defendant's health and accident insurance policy offered through his
employment.
18. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the Oldsmobile and the
Defendant shall be awarded the Monte- Carlo, both free and clear of
any interest of the other party.
19. The Defendant shall be allowed to claim the minor children as
exemptions for income tax purposes.
20. The Plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 in attorneys fees.
amount shall be paid to Plaintiff's attorney.

The attorneys fees may

be paid in monthly installments as agreed upon by Defendant and
counsel for Plaintiff.
Dated this <=rC day of December, 1990.
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This

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that 1 am employed by the office of Day & Barney, and
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of
Divorce, postage pre-paid, to:
Paul D. Lyman, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
250 N. Main
Richfield, Utah 8 1/01
on thxs

day of December, 1990.

GREGORY B. WALL (3365)
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
521-8220
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
)

ARBRA F. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff
V.

:
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:

MERRILL D. JOHNSON,
Defendant

: Civil No. 894904175 DA
: Judge Sandra Peuler
)

On the 12th day of June, 1996, the defendant's petition to
modify the Decree of Divorce by eliminating the alimony requirement
entirely, together with the plaintiff's counter petition to modify
the Decree to increase the alimony award to her, came on for
hearing before the court sitting without a jury, the honorable
Sandra Peuler presiding. The plaintiff was present and represented
by her attorney, Gregory B. Wall.

The defendant was present and

represented by his attorney, Paul D. Lyman.

Both parties were

sworn and testified concerning the issues presented here. Various
exhibits were introduced and received by the court. Based upon the
testimony and evidence, and the court being fully advised in the
premises and the law, does herewith make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. At the time of the Decree the child support paid to

plaintiff was $58

1 ner month, alimony of $350.00 per month,

income from her shop of $110.00 per month, for a monthly income of
$1,048.00.
2. At the time of the entry of the Decree her expenses were
$1,250.00.
3. At the time of the entry of the Decree her income did not
meet her expenses, let alone the standard of living she had enjoyed
during the course of her marriage of 24 years to the defendant.
4. Since t:l le date of the Decree the plaintiff has completed
her education at the University o^

T

ir*

has become employed

full time, with 1 monthly gross income of $1,573.00, and a net take
home pay of

83.82.

This figure was arrived at b> adding back

a couple of small voluntary contributions deducted from

her pay,

and multiplying a pay period, found to be 80 hours, times 2.15.
5. The court finds that her ciii:reiit shop income is $200.00 per
month, and that her child support is $294.00 per month.
6

If the plaintiff receives no alimony her monthly income is

$1,577.00.
7. Since
increased

and

the date
the

of

court

the Decree

finds

that

her

expenses

her monthly

have also

expenses

are

$1,824.00 per month, which leaves her approximately $250.00 per
month short of her expense needs.
8. The plaintiff has testified and the court finds that her
income does not meet her needs.
9. The plaintiff is unable to purchase sufficient clothing and
food for herse] f a rid the :il :ti ] d
10

Based

upon

the

testimony

the

plaintiff's

expenses

substantially

exceed

her monthly

income

and

her

income

falls

substantially short of meeting her needs.
11. Since the date of the Decree the defendant's income has
also increased.

At the time of the Decree his income was found to

be $3,100.00 per month.

His income for 1994 was $3,800.00 per

month, and he testified that it remained about the same for 1995 as
it was for 1994.
12. The defendant's income after taxes is $2,60.0.00 per month,
and his expenses, including his child support obligation, total
$2,083.00 per month.
13. The

court

finds that the defendant

has a

continuing

ability to pay alimony in the amount originally ordered by the
court.
14. Alimony has been in place five years, but the plaintiff is
has still not reached a level to support her needs, let alone her
prior standard of living, without alimony from the defendant.
15. The purpose of alimony to provide a standard of living for
the divorced spouse commensurate with her standard of living during
the marriage has not been met, yet the defendant has continued to
enjoy the same standard of living that he had during the marriage.
16.

The

defendant

has urged

the

court

to

find

that

the

plaintiff could obtain financial relief by refinancing the home,
but there has been no evidence presented that she could qualify,
what the payments might be, or what relief might be provided.
Defendant has asked the court to speculate as to the effects of
refinancing the home and other avenues of relief through obtaining
loans by plaintiff, but no evidence has been presented to support

any

finding

in defendant's

favor,

n

that

such

avenues would

provide any relief to the plaintiff.

17. The defendant has alleged in his petition to modify that
an agreement was entered into by the parties to terminate the
alimony in the fall of 1994, or spring of 1995.
18. There is evidence that

the parties discussed

alimony

termination, but there is no evidence that there was ever a meeting
Q£

^Yie minds on any terms of an agreement to terminate.

Although

offers and counteroffers were made over a period of time there was
never an agreement reached nor any offer accepted by either party.
19. While the defendant's petition is based solely upon the
agreement, the parties have mutually agreed that the court could
consider the issue of a substantial change in circumstances.
20. The plaintiff's counter petition Li increase the alimony
is likewise not supported by a substantial change in circumstances
of the parties.
21. The plai nl i I I ha,; im ut n il i linney's fees, but she lacks
the ability to pay those fees.
the

ability

attorney's

to

fees,

assist
plus

the

At the same time the defendant has
plaintiff

the court

in

the

I indi» IhiL

substantially prevailed in these proceedings.

payment
I he

of

pLamtiff

her
has

Evidence has been

received as to the fees incurred and the reasonableness of the
fees.

Ihe euuit finds the fees to be reasonable and necessary I i u

the purpose of representing the plaintiff, and accordingly a fair
amount

of

$1,500 00.

tees

to be paid by defendant

to

the plaintiff

is

22. The defendant unilaterally ceased paying alimony to the
plaintiff in April, 1995, his last payment being for that month,
but no payments have been since.

The plaintiff should be granted

a judgment for the arrearage, which totals $7,150.00 through and
including June, 1996.
FROM THE FOREGOING the court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. There has been no substantial

change

in

circumstances

warranting modifying the Decree of Divorce to either decrease,
eliminate altogether, or increase the alimony paid to the plaintiff
by defendant, and therefore the monthly amount of $550.00 shall
continue.

Accordingly, the petitions of both parties should be

denied.
2. There was no agreement reached by the parties to either
decrease or eliminate the alimony requirement.
3. The plaintiff is entitled to back alimony not paid to her
by the defendant, commencing with payment due for May, 1995, and
which amount totals $7,150.00 through June, 1996, and a judgment
for said amount shall be entered against the defendant and in favor
of plaintiff, plus interest thereon at the rate of 7.35% per annum.
He shall be given the right to make reasonable monthly payments to
pay said indebtedness.
4. A judgment against defendant and in favor of plaintiff
shall be entered in the amount of $1,500.00 for attorney's fees
incurred by plaintiff, plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum.

The defendant

shall be given the opportunity

to make

reasonable monthly payments thereon.
5. As long as reasonable and regular monthly payments are made
on the above judgments the plaintiff may not execute on said
judgments.
6. Defendant shall pay his own costs and attorney's fees
incurred in these proceedings.
DATED this
BY THE COURT:

SANDRA PEULER
District Judge

Approved as to form:

Stux
PAUL D. LYMAN
Attorney for Defendant

day of

, 1996.

GREGORY B. WALL (33 65)
WALL & WALL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
521-8220
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
)

ARBRA F. JOHNSON,

:
)
:

Plaintiff
V.

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

:

)

Civil No. 894904175 DA

)
:

Judge Sandra Peuler

MERRILL D. JOHNSON,
Defendant

)

On the L2th day of June, 1996, the petition of the defendant
to terminate alimony to the plaintiff and the petition of the
plaintiff to increase the amount of alimony both came on for
hearing before the court, the honorable Sandra Peuler presiding.
The plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney, Gregory
B. Wall. The defendant was likewise present and represented by his
attorney, Paul D. Lyman.
Both parties were sworn and testified, evidence was offered
and received by the court, and the court being fully advised in the
law and the premises, and the court having heretofore made and
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does herewith
ADJUDGE AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Neither

party

has

shown

a

substantial

circumstances warranting a modification of

change

in

the Decree as to

alimony,

and

accordingly

the alimony payment

to be paid to

plaintiff by defendant in the amount of $550.00 per month shall
continue without change.
2. The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the arrearage
in alimony that have accrued, which total $7,150.00 through June,
1996.

A judgment against defendant and in favor of plaintiff for

said amount is granted with interest thereon at the rate of 7.35%
per annum
payments

The defendant is ordered to make reasonable monthly
on

this amount

to the plaintiff

and

plaintiff

is

restrained from executing upon the judgment provided the defendant
makes regular monthly payments in reasonable amounts.
defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of
$1,500.00 for her attorney's fees incurred in these proceedings,
with interest thereon at the rate of 7.35% per annum.

The

defendant is ordered to make regular monthly payments on this
amount and the plaintiff is restrained from executing on said
judgment provided the defendant makes regular, reasonable monthly
payments.
4, 1To agreement was made between the parties to modify or
eliminate the alimony and the petition of defendant to modify the
decree on the basis of an agreement between the parties is denied.
5. Defendant is directed to pay his own costs and attorney's
fees incurred in this action.
DATED this
BY THE COURT:

SANDRA PEULER

day of

, 1996.

District Court Judge
The foregoing Decree approved as to form:

PAUL D. LYMAN
Attorney for Defendant

STEVEN B. WALL, NO. 3679
WALL & WALL, a.p.c.
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8220
IN THh THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRH I COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARBRA JOHNSON,
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
AND DECREE

Plaintiff,
vs.

( iv i I Mo

II 149 04 I /S 1)/,

MERRILL I). JOHNSON,

Judge Peuler

Defendant.
TO THE DEFENDANT ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD:
You are hereby not itiod t hat the Judgment

m d Decree filed in

the above-entitled matter was entered by the Court on the 5th day
of August, 109G.
DATED this

day

A lit J It

GREGORY B / WALL,
Attorney «aor Plaintiff

WAIL & WALL (A.PC)
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
"' WTE 800 BOSTON BU'LDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Entry of Judgment and Decree was mailed,
postage prepaid to on this

Q

day of August, 1996 to the

following:
Paul Lyman, Esq.
835 East 300 North, #100
Richfield, Utah 84701

retary "to Gregory^B. Wall

In the Third lidiciul District Court of Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH

Case No.

Plaintiff

vs.

Jhiii;i 111 nil 1 h/chriifiofi
Dated:

Defendant
Husband:

Wife:
Address:

Address: _

ALhr^_J.ohns.ojTL
3442 B r e t t Avenue
West V a l l e y C i t y . UT 8 4 1 1 9

Soc. Sec. No.:.

Soc. Sec. No.:

528-68-6546

Occupation:

Occupation:

Administrative Assistant

Employer:

Employer:

C o r p . of t h e P r e s i d e n t - L . D . S .

Birthdate:

Birthdate:

4/24/46

Church

NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR
ITS DECISION.
ANY F A L S E STA I E M E N T MADE H E R E O N SHALL S U B J E C T YOU TO T H E P E N A L T Y FOR
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4.3; if figures are on a bi-weekly
basis, multiply by 2.167)
1.

every

HUSBAND

$

Gross monlhly income from:
Snlnry nrul wages, including commissions, bonuses,
allowances and overtime, payable

period)

|

|

WIFE

$

i,ao0.oo

(pay

2 weeks

Pensions and retirement
Social security
Disability and unemployment insurance
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.).

294.00

Child support from nny prior mnrringc
Dividends and interest
Rents _ _
All other sources: (Specify) H ^ i r

Havpn

.Shyl i n g

207.00

. 9 ^ 1 r>n

r

$

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOMF

$
* 1 , T*01. 00

Itemize monthly deductions from gross income:
State and federal income taxes
Number of exemptions taken

...

Social security
Medical or other insurance (describe fully)

24 h r . A c c i d e n t a l

Death & Dismemberment

259.02
0
122.55
59.36
1.84

Union or other dues
Retirement or pension fund
Savings plan
Credit union

.

25.84 —

Other: (specify)

UTA

BUS

Office

7.60
2.00
$ 488.21
$

PASS

Fund
$
$

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS
Net monthly income • take home pay
Debts and obligations:
Creditor's Name

For

Dale Payable

First Instate Bank Aut.omobiJLe
Bank One Mortgage Corp.
Home
Perkins/NDSL
Loan
E^Jierj$^JTe.c_^
NaHnnal Reanty
S h o p Tj_r_ensing F e e s

Balance

In.c_,_ l o a n
Service
Shop
d i t y , county, s t a t e

1st
1st
1.0 t h
lOtJh
yearly

242.96
224.00
40.00

.&S_09-

jza&o^ad

7.55

10.00
$

TOTAL

Monthly Payment

$9AJL5^AA
5923.78
_lS_Q4_^&d

...1.0 th.....

7511Pi.fidl$

RRQfiO

(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule)
5.

AH property of the parties known to mc owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband, (W) Wife, (J) Jointly).
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE.
Value

Owed Thereon

$

(a) Household furnishings, furniture,

$

1,000.00

appliances and equipment
(b) Automobile (Year-Make)

1995

First

Saturn

SL2

Interstate

0

JL4U52JL^&Q_

Bank

Q

r

47S.44

(W)

(c) Securities - stocks, bonds

(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans,
credit unions - savings and checking)

West One Bank
G r a n i t e C r e d i t Union
OppenheimerFunds

1 J 85Q..J.2_
257.15
7,077.06

(e) Life Insurance:

Cash value, accumulated

Name o' Ccr~p:iny

Policy No.

Farmpr'.q M e w W o r l d T.i f P
Deseret Healthcare Life

(0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounls

Name

Pinnppr

TT

(IRA

Name
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify)

Face Ar:ount

dividend, or loan amount

001 ^07645 $ S,Q??.7fi$ mortgage
AQ^OSUDJO _ r e d u c i n g

Ins.
to $10,000

Value of interest and amount presently vested

__$.50o...o.a

(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach slice! with identical information for all additional property)

Address__3-442-Brett A v e n u e
(Jl)
flp.Qh V a l l e y C i t y , UT 8 4 1 1 9

Type of Property

Original CostS . . J L 6 L , _ 2 0 . . 0 - - 0 0

Total Present Value $ . . 8 5 / J3Q.Q_._0_0

___

Cost of Additions % _ 1 . 0 L L J 0 O . O _ . J O O

R e s Lden.tJLaJL

Date of Acquisition

Basis of Valuation

7 / 3 / 7 0

homes s o l d

in

the

area

Total Cost $ J2.6^-O.Q_^OQ
Mtg. Balance $ 5 _ , 9 2 3 , 7 6 Other Liens $ _ 8 ^ _ 5 0 J 0 _ - _ O 0
Equity $ _ 2 0 , 5 7 . f i . J M L _
Monthly Amortization
Z.Z.H . 00

And to whom Bank One M o r t g a g e

Corp

Taxes $ 6 1 5 . 8_3_
Individual contributions

(i)

»^T~~

Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness)

Hair Haven Styling Salon/ Owner/operator, None

(j)

Other assets (Specify)

Total monthly expenses: *(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and rclalionship of all members of the household whose
expenses arc included.)

WIFE

HUSBAND

• W = Custodial Parent
Marilyn - Daughter

$

$
224.00

Rent or mortgage payments (residence)
Real property taxes (residence)
Real property insurance (residence)
Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies

|

Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat
Telephone
Laundry and cleaning

|
\

Clothing

Medical

Prescriptions

Dental
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, disability) Exclude Payroll Deducted
Child Care
Payment of child spousal support re: prior marriage
School
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation)
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations)
Transportation (other than automobile)
Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance)
Auto payments

1

Installment paymcnt(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule

105.06

if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof)
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule)

$
TOTAL EXPENSES

Included!
Incliidedj
207.1"150.00 1
181.34
32.08
20.00
1R6.00
23.00
0
6.34
N/A
N/A
8.33
10.00
170.66
N/A
167.71
242,96

1

$

89.64
LVZ4.25

[
1

STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct.
Subscribed and sworn lo before nuc this

d a y «>l

. W.

Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

My Commission Expires:.

BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX
RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS,
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION.

